Norms and Sanctions as a Basis for Promoting Cybersecurity Practices by Ajmeri, Nirav et al.
Norms and Sanctions as a Basis for Promoting Cybersecurity
Practices
Nirav Ajmeri†, Shubham Goyal‡, and Munindar P. Singh†
†North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA
‡Amazon, Seattle, WA, USA
najmeri@ncsu.edu, gsshubha@ncsu.edu, mpsingh@ncsu.edu
Abstract
Many cybersecurity breaches occur due to users not fol-
lowing good cybersecurity practices, chief among them
being regulations for applying software patches to op-
erating systems, updating applications, and maintaining
strong passwords.
We capture cybersecurity expectations on users as
norms. We empirically investigate sanctioning mecha-
nisms in promoting compliance with those norms as well
as the detrimental effect of sanctions on the ability of users
to complete their work. We realize these ideas in a game
that emulates the decision making of workers in a research
lab.
Through a human-subject study, we find that whereas
individual sanctions are more effective than group sanc-
tions in achieving compliance and less detrimental on the
ability of users to complete their work, individual sanc-
tions offer significantly lower resilience especially for or-
ganizations comprising risk seekers. Our findings have
implications for workforce training in cybersecurity.
1 Introduction
As computing has spread into every part of our economic
and personal lives, two related trends are apparent: (1) cy-
bersecurity threats can place more and more of our wel-
fare at risk; and (2) attackers have more to gain from suc-
cessful attacks and, therefore, the number and variety of
attacks are proliferating. At the same time, user behavior
inadvertently provides pathways through which attackers
can succeed.
Recognizing the challenges in user behavior, organi-
zations have created cybersecurity regulations [1] to cod-
ify best practices such as keeping operating systems and
applications up to date, disabling unused network ports
and services, and not sharing passwords. Following the
hygiene metaphor, we adopt the term immunity tasks for
such practices. However, compliance with regulations is
rarely adequate and security breaches continue to occur.
As an illustration, Kafalı et al. [2] documented healthcare
security and privacy breaches (each of which affected 500
or more patients) with respect to user behavior in light of
security and privacy regulations.
Because the actions or nonactions (e.g., carelessness)
of one user affect outcomes for others, achieving good cy-
bersecurity practices maps to social norms. Sanctions [3]
provide a recognized means to establish norms but have
not been studied in connection with cybersecurity.
Contributions. We investigate how sanctions can pro-
mote cybersecurity practices. Specifically, we investigate
three research questions in reference to sanction types
(group, individual, and peer, which we explain below) and
risk attitudes.
• How effectively does a sanction type lead to im-
proved cybersecurity practices?
• How detrimental is a sanction type to user produc-
tivity?
• What influence does a sanction type has on workers
with different risk attitudes?
Approach and findings in brief. We develop a game
to simulate a real-life work setting, such as a corporate
office, where workers complete assigned tasks while us-
ing computers. Each player assumes the role of an office
worker and is challenged to complete assigned tasks (cap-
tured as points earned) along with maintaining the secu-
rity of their computer. Failure to complete an immunity
task may attract sanctions, causing a loss in points earned
or the loss of an opportunity to earn points.
Our human-subject study using this game yields the
following findings. First, workers complete more tasks
and are sanctioned less often under individual sanctions
than under group sanctions. Experience improves the ad-
vantage for individual sanctions in promoting compliance.
Second, workers under individual sanctioning are more
productive and lose less time due to being sanctioned
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than under group sanctioning. Third, individual sanction-
ing yields lower resilience with risk-seeking workers, i.e.,
risk seekers recover slower from an attack than risk-averse
workers.
In addition, group sanctioning leads to twice the num-
ber of peer sanctions than individual sanctioning, which
indicates the potential for a self-regulating environment
in which users monitor each other and intervene to im-
prove adoption of cybersecurity practices. Group sanc-
tioning also yields better resilience with workers having
risk-seeking attitudes.
2 Related Work
We describe selected research most relevant to this work.
Beris et al. [4] study workers in organizations to un-
derstand their risk attitudes regarding cybersecurity and
how those attitudes correlate with security practices. They
find that compliance is improved when security policies
are aligned with productive activity. In contrast, we seek
to understand how users behave with the end of identify-
ing interventions, including by users themselves, that can
improve the adoption of good security practices.
Frey et al. [5] relate cybersecurity with gameplay as
a basis for exploring security decision making by stake-
holders, e.g., where to make investments in the way of
infrastructure. Their game considers external threats. In
contrast, our study is focused on interventions that im-
prove compliance while maintaining productivity.
We draw upon research on norms outside of cyberse-
curity. We adopt the idea of sanctions as negative rewards
from research on norms [6, 7, 8]. Importantly, sanctions
are valuable in helping an agent learn applicable norms
by experiencing positive or negative sanctions applied as
a result of their actions.
Mahmoud et al. [9] propose a resource-aware adaptive
punishment technique that enables norm establishment
with larger neighborhood sizes than resource-unaware
punishment. They evaluate the adaptive technique via a
simulation. Dell’Anna et al. [10] develop a norm revision
mechanism that considers agents’ preferences and revises
norms by revising associated sanctions at runtime. They
evaluate their mechanism on a traffic simulator ring road
environment.
Andrighetto et al. [7] suggest combining punishments
(negative sanctions) with norm communication to im-
prove compliance, instead of using the two separately.
They conduct a human-subject study where subjects play
a standard public-goods game to evaluate their hypothesis.
Patel et al. [11] study how people hold expectations
about each other’s behavior and how the violation of
such expectations influences their interactions with each
other. They focus on software engineering and analyze
mobile app features and reviews in their study. Goyal
et al. [12] study cybersecurity compliance in a game en-
vironment. They, however, do not investigate intrica-
cies such as how workers’ risk attitudes influence norm
compliance—which we investigate here.
Villatoro et al. [13] study the effectiveness of group
sanctions in enforcing norm compliance. They find group
sanctions as a powerful way to regulate behavior via a
laboratory experiment. Aldewereld et al. [6] show how
group norms, which apply to a group, differ from indi-
vidual norms in terms of responsibility and fulfillment.
Norms can be internally enforced, e.g., when noncompli-
ance triggers emotions of shame or guilt. Such internal
controls are valuable in settings where it may be difficult
to monitor and enforce compliance. We study group sanc-
tions since they may lead to improved compliance.
3 Examples: Individual, Group,
Peer Sanctions
Individual and group sanctions are applied by a manager,
a designated party who has the responsibility of moni-
toring and sanctioning, and peer sanctions are applied by
users.
Example 1 (Secure Co.) Consider Alex, Bob, Charlie,
and Dave, who are software developers working at Se-
cure Co. Each of them has a workstation connected to the
same network. Each developer is tasked with one or more
projects using tools available on his or her workstation.
Each software developer has a risk attitude and other per-
sonality traits. Additionally, Secure Co. has defined cy-
bersecurity regulations such as updating passwords peri-
odically, and installing security patches. The developers
are expected to comply with these regulations. Erin is an
IT manager who looks after compliance with cybersecu-
rity regulations.
Consider a case where Alex does not patch his work-
station in time against an OS vulnerability. Erin observes
that Alex’s workstation was not patched. She disconnects
it from the local network so that other workstations are not
at risk, and patches it. Erin takes some time to patch the
computer, during which Alex cannot work. Erin’s discon-
necting Alex’s workstation is an example of an individual
sanction where the person who failed to comply with the
regulation is sanctioned [3].
Alternatively, on noticing that Alex’s workstation was
not patched in time and could have affected other work-
stations on the same network, Erin along with disconnect-
ing Alex’s workstation, disconnects Bob’s, Charlie’s, and
Dave’s workstations. Erin disconnecting all the worksta-
tions prevents all developers from working on their re-
spective tasks. This is an example of a group sanction.
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Consider another case where Alex has not patched his
workstation. Bob notices that Alex has not patched his
workstation and fears that an exploit of a vulnerability on
Alex’s workstation could result in all their workstations
being compromised. Bob frowns at Alex and asks Alex to
patch his workstation, suggesting that all the workstations
on the network would be at risk. Bob’s frowning is an
example of a peer sanction [3, 14].
4 Model of Enterprise Cybersecu-
rity
We now delineate a simplified multiagent systems model
of work in an enterprise and how it relates to cybersecu-
rity.
Active entities. This model has three active entities. For
simplicity, we assume a unique manager and a set of two
or more workers. Each worker uses a computer and ad-
ministers some aspects of the computer, such as the tim-
ing of any software updates. Attackers seek to compro-
mise the workers’ computers. We don’t model attackers
explicitly but include them in the environment—the envi-
ronment may launch cyberattacks against the enterprise.
Tasks. A worker is assigned projects, which comprise
project tasks that the worker must complete. In addition,
a worker performs immunity tasks, such as patching the
operating system, upgrading the firewall, and changing a
password to maintain compliance with security policies.
Norms and sanctions. A norm characterizes the correct
interactions between agents. Specifically, a commitment
is a type of norm that captures what a worker is expected
to do under what circumstances and a prohibition is a type
of norm that captures what a worker is expected to re-
frain from doing under what circumstances. We model
norms that apply on workers with respect to each other
or the manager, but not on the manager or the environ-
ment. A worker is accountable for each applicable norm.
When a worker does not follow a norm for which he or
she is accountable, we state that the norm is violated by
that worker.
We model enterprise security policies as well as work-
ers’ expectations of each other as norms. Norms that ap-
ply to each worker with respect to the manager and each
other are to patch his or her computer and update his or
her password. For simplicity, we write these norms as
Patching and Updating Passwords, respectively. Suppose
Secure Co. requires workers to update passwords every
month: hence, a commitment applying on each worker.
A worker who has not updated password for more than a
month is in violation.
A sanction is a response to a norm violation. We adopt
ideas from Nardin et al.’s (2016) typology. For simplic-
ity, we consider only negative sanctions (punishments). In
real life, completing an immunity task does not provide
explicit rewards but not completing it can lead to negative
consequences in the form of cyberattacks. In the same
spirit, we adopt negative sanctions as a consequence of
not following a norm.
We consider three types of sanctions.
• An individual sanction is applied by the manager
to a specific worker. The manager can partially
observe the security of all computers and can de-
termine if a norm violation has occurred. For ex-
ample, a manager may disconnect a worker’s com-
puter from the enterprise network until the worker
addresses the security weakness.
• A group sanction is applied by the manager to the
entire set of workers. For example, a manager may
disconnect all workers’ computers from the enter-
prise network until the one worker who violated se-
curity policies addresses the security weakness on
his or her computer. That is, other workers would
suffer for no fault of theirs.
• A peer sanction is a sanction from a worker to a
peer. Each worker can observe a peer’s compliance
with norms. The wish to avoid a group sanction by
manager can motivate a compliant worker to peer
sanction a noncompliant worker.
Actions. Each worker may choose an action from avail-
able alternatives given its resources and beliefs. A worker
can perform the following actions: (1) perform a project
task; (2) perform an immunity task; (3) observe and peer
sanction a colleague; and (4) skip—when the worker has
just been sanctioned by the manager or a peer. A peer
sanction is automatically lifted after one time step.
The manager observes the system state and sanctions
a worker. The manager imposes sanctions probabilisti-
cally upon norm violation—to capture the idea that a non-
compliant worker can escape notice and may yet suffer an
attack. Each sanction is lifted after two time steps.
The environment’s action is to attack.
States. The system state composes the states of the work-
ers and their computers. A worker’s state is a pair of his or
her compliance status (whether compliant or noncompli-
ant) and sanctioning status (whether currently sanctioned
or not). Initially, a worker is compliant and not sanc-
tioned.
A worker transitions between these states depending
upon his or her actions and those of the manager and of
other workers, and of the environment.
• A project task is enabled except when the worker is
in a sanctioned state and doesn’t affect either the
compliance or the sanctioning components of its
state.
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• An immunity task is enabled only when the worker
is in the noncompliant state and restores com-
pliance (once all security vulnerabilities are ad-
dressed) but doesn’t affect the sanctioning compo-
nent.
• A peer sanction by the worker on someone else
doesn’t affect either component.
• A peer sanction received by the worker doesn’t af-
fect compliance status but transitions into a sanc-
tioned state. The worker who issues the sanction
loses a step.
• An individual or group sanction received by the
worker doesn’t affect compliance status but transi-
tions into a sanctioned state.
A computer cycles between three states (safe, vulner-
able, and unusable). Initially, a computer is safe. A com-
puter transitions to the vulnerable state when there is an
attack. The worker assigned to the computer must per-
form an immunity task to restore it to a safe state. How-
ever, the worker may choose not to perform the immunity
task and instead continue with a project task. An attack on
a safe computer makes it vulnerable (modeled as immu-
nity loss) but an attack on a vulnerable computer causes it
to become unusable. When that happens, the worker loses
all incomplete work and must perform an immunity task
to restore the computer to the safe state before proceeding.
4.1 Game Design
A game enables learners to experience situations that are
infeasible in the real world for reasons of safety, cost,
and time. Role-playing is an established technique for
educational activities, and can foster intrinsic motivation.
Also, users are familiar with rewards via reputation points,
badges, and leader boards. We designed a web-based
game, a screenshot of which is shown in Figure 1, fol-
lowing the above model.
The game considers three tasks. Tblue, Tred and
Tyellow, represented by blue, red, and yellow tiles. Part 1
of Figure 1 shows the project section. There are three
types of project, small, medium, and large, with one, two,
and three tasks, respectively. The set of tasks that makes
up a project is chosen randomly. For instance, in Figure 1
the medium project is made up of red and yellow tasks.
After a player completes all the tasks of a project, new
resources are assigned to the project randomly. A player
needs to complete all the tasks in a project to gain the
points associated with the project.
Each task is mapped to immunity (Ii) and capability
(Ci) shown in Parts 2 and 3, respectively. Each attack is
directed toward a particular immunity. After an attack Ai,
the player loses immunity Ii. For instance, a yellow at-
tack takes away the yellow immunity. This is equivalent
to a computer being in the vulnerable state. The player is
given a deadline Di. The player can transition back to the
safe state by performing the requisite immunity task—in
game terms, clicking relevant tiles in the immunity sec-
tion. If the player does not perform the immunity task
by deadline Di, the player transitions to the noncompliant
state and can be sanctioned by the manager. (The manager
is not a player but is automated in the game engine.)
If there is an attack Ai for which the immunity Ii was
already lost, the player loses the associated capability Ci.
Losing a capability is equivalent to the computer being
in unusable. When a player loses the capability Ci, the
player cannot complete the corresponding task Ti until the
player completes the associated immunity tasks.
A player’s objective in the game is to earn the
most points analogous to compensation from complet-
ing projects. Players can see each other’s current score
(Part 4).
The game is divided into 40 rounds: each player must
make a move in each round or explicitly skip it.
4.2 Realizing our Enterprise Model in the
Game
Each component of our enterprise model maps directly
to the game. The players are workers; the manager and
environment are implemented in the engine.
Figure 1 (left) shows that an immunity task has a dead-
line of three rounds, i.e., the player gets three rounds to
complete the immunity task after the immunity is lost
without the risk of being sanctioned. A norm on a player
is to complete the immunity task before the deadline.
Player Actions. A player can take one of these actions:
• Complete project task. Figure 1 (left) shows the
points awarded and the number of tasks required
for each project type. A player is awarded a score
corresponding to a project only after he or she com-
pletes all of that project’s tasks.
• Complete immunity tasks. A player does not receive
points for completing an immunity task but should
complete it to avoid sanctions and to retain avail-
ability of a resource.
• Peer sanction. A player can peer sanction another
player.
• Skip. When a player is sanctioned by the manager,
the player must skip that turn and clicks the pass
button to acknowledge the loss of a turn.
Manager Actions. The manager (with some probability)
observes the immunities of each player at the beginning of
each round. If the manager observes that a player has not
completed an immunity task past its deadline, the man-
ager sanctions the player at the beginning of the round.
The sanction can be group or individual, depending on
the game.
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Game Parameter Settings
Parameter Value
Immunity task deadline 3
Attack probability 0.35
Manager observability 0.33
Small project score 10
Medium project score 25
Large project score 45
Tasks in small project 1
Tasks in medium project 2
Tasks in large project 3
Figure 1: Game screenshot. Dashboard view of a single player showing five parts of the game. (Parameter settings are
overlaid on the left.)
Environment Actions. We set the attack probability to
0.35 for all games, as listed in Figure 1 (left), so that the
attacks in a game are neither too many nor too few. Too
high an attack probability would result in players losing
their capabilities frequently and too low an attack prob-
ability would lead them to suffer no loss. The former
would induce excessive caution (always complete immu-
nity tasks first) and sloppiness (always complete project
tasks first), respectively. We wanted the players to con-
stantly choose between the immunity task and project
tasks.
There are four types of attack. Three of them, Ai (for
i being blue, red, or yellow, result in either the loss of the
corresponding immunity, Ii, or if the immunity is already
lost, then in the loss of availability of the corresponding
resource Ri. Ablack attack is equivalent to the other three
attacks happening simultaneously. A player must com-
plete all immunity tasks within their respective deadlines.
The probabilities of blue, red, and yellow attacks are equal
and three times the probability of the black attack.
Sanctions. There are two ways of sanctioning in the
game. One, via a group or individual sanction by the man-
ager, where a player is forced to pass a certain number of
rounds. The number of rounds skipped, n, is equal to
twice the number of unfinished immunity tasks. After n
rounds, the player gains back the immunity for which he
or she was sanctioned.
Two, via loss of a capability needed for a task Ti. In
this case, the player can no longer complete a task until
the immunity is regained. For example, if a player loses
the red capability after two red attacks, the player cannot
complete the red task until the player completes the red
immunity task.
5 Experimental Setup
Our study included the following steps.
Risk Attitude Survey. We employ DOSPERT to assess
participants’ risk-seeking attitude [15]. DOSPERT
is a psychometric scale to assess risk seeking in five
content domains: financial decisions, health and
safety, recreational, ethical, and social decisions. A
higher score on DOSPERT scale indicates a greater
willingness to take risks. We choose DOSPERT
because of its compactness. Longer alternatives
would leave participants with less time for game-
play.
Training. Each participant watched a five-minute video
explaining the game, and then played two demo
games, excluded in our statistical evaluation. Par-
ticipants were informed that these games will not be
evaluated and were encouraged to familiarize them-
selves with different elements of the game. Demo
games demonstrated individual and group sanction.
Gameplay. Each participant played four games. Two
with individual sanctions (InS1, InS2) and two with
group sanctions (GrS1, GrS2), in arbitrary order.
After each game, participants completed a short
post-game survey to record their opinions on the
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sanction policy employed in the game.
We configure each game to apply either group or
individual sanctions in addition to peer sanction.
Post Survey. After the gameplay, participants completed
a post-study survey capturing their overall feed-
back.
Incentives. Each player received a payment that had a
fixed component as well as a bonus based on their
score. The motivation for the bonus was to encour-
age players to perform well.
6 Metrics
We computed the following metrics.
Compliance measures the frequency of a worker being
compliant. We measure compliance via these met-
rics:
• Completed Immunity Tasks: After an attack, a
player loses an immunity (Si) and is given a
deadline (Di) to fix it. Regaining immunity is
through the completion of an immunity task.
• Manager Sanctions counts the number of
sanctions by the manager, which happen when
a player does not complete an immunity task
by its deadline. For individual sanction, we
calculate the total number of sanctions is-
sued. For group sanction, we calculate the to-
tal number of sanctions issued to the group,
irrespective of the number of players in the
group.
Efficacy measures how productive participants are in
completing their project. We measure efficacy via
these metrics:
• Score: Cumulative value gains from the tasks
completed, indicating productivity.
• Rounds skipped: Whenever a player is sanc-
tioned by peers or the manager, the player is
forced to skip one or more rounds, which in-
dicates loss in productivity due to noncompli-
ance.
Resilience measures how quickly the system returns to
the state of being norm compliant. We measure re-
silience by calculating the number of rounds taken
by a player to regain an immunity after losing it.
7 Results and Discussion
The study sought to compare how people respond to
each sanctioning mechanism and how their productivity in
completing project task is affected by these mechanisms.
We conducted our study on Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) (available at https://www.mturk.com/mturk/)
where participants played the game. The study was ap-
proved by our university’s Institutional Review Board. We
collected an informed consent from each participant and
provided a payment on completion of the study. Partici-
pants were allowed to participate only once in the study to
mitigate the threat of learning. The study was conducted
in slots of 60 minutes. Thirty participants participated
in the study playing 107 games. The group size for the
games varied from two to five.
All game parameters other than the sanctioning
method were fixed throughout the study (Figure 1). We
recorded every move made by a player in every game and
evaluated this data to compare group and individual sanc-
tion with respect to each of the measures described below.
We test significance via the two-tailed paired t-test.
We measure the effect size using Hedges’ g [16], which
is computed as the difference in the means divided by the
pooled weighted standard deviation. We choose Hedges’
g to measure effect size because it is better suited for
smaller sample sizes. Recognizing some caveats, we
adopt Cohen’s (1988) suggestion to interpret effects above
0.20, 0.50, and 0.80 as small, medium, and large.
7.1 Compliance
Figure 2a shows the percentage of immunity tasks com-
pleted before their deadline. Individual sanction offers a
small improvement in compliance over group sanction.
We calculate the number of manager sanctions per
number of attacks in a game. Figure 2b shows that on
average, for every 100 attacks, there were 23 instances of
players being sanctioned under individual sanction and 47
instances of players being sanctioned under group sanc-
tion. This medium effect is statistically significant to 1%
but compatible with the result in Figure 2a.
For each sanction type, we calculated the difference
between the number of immunity tasks per attack com-
pleted by a player to measure the influence of sanction on
the player. Figure 2c shows that on average a player com-
pleted 13% more immunity tasks per attack in the second
game (InS2) than in the first game (InS1) with individual
sanctions. For group sanctions, the number of immunity
tasks completed in games GrS1 and GrS2 was unaffected.
This medium effect is statistically significant to 2%, sig-
nifying that individual sanction was more effective than
group sanction in motivating people to be security compli-
ant. We conjecture that whereas (1) experience improves
the advantage of individual sanctions in promoting com-
pliance, (2) experience has no effect for group sanctions.
We found 14 instances of peer sanction in games with
group sanction (µ = 1.24) and seven instances of peer
sanction in games with individual sanction (µ = 0.75).
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0 20 40 60 80 100
Individual
Group
µindividual(62%) > µgroup(57%),
p = 0.30, g = 0.19
(a) Percentage of immunity tasks completed before dead-
line.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Individual
Group
µindividual(23.12%) < µgroup(46.84%),
p = 0.01, g = 0.75
(b) Number of manager sanctions per 100 attacks.
−60 −30 0 30 60
Individual
Group
Percentage difference in immunity tasks completed
µindividual(13.24%) > µgroup(0.68%),
p = 0.03, g = 0.70
(c) Difference in immunity tasks completed before dead-
line between first game (InS1 or GrS1) and second game
(InS2 or GrS2).
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Risk averse
Risk seeking
Immunity tasks completed before deadline
µIRA (50.36%) < µIRS (66.51%); p < 0.01.
(d) Risk-seeking (RS) players completed significantly
more immunity tasks before deadline than risk-averse
(RA) players.
Figure 2: Influence of sanctions on compliance.
This indicates that group sanctions promote peer sanc-
tions more than individual sanctions.
To investigate if risk attitudes influence compliance,
we categorize each player as a risk-seeking player or a
risk-averse player based on the players’ social and finan-
cial risk scores obtained from the DOSPERT survey.
Figure 2d compares the percentage of immunity tasks
completed before their deadline by risk-seeking and risk-
averse players. We find that risk-seeking players are
more compliant—complete more immunity tasks by the
deadline—than risk-averse players, and as a result, are
sanctioned less often. We observe this trend—where risk-
seeking players complete the immunity tasks though near
the deadline—with both individual and group sanction
games.
After each game, players rated on a Likert scale of 1
(not at all influential ) to 5 (very influential ), how effective
the sanctioning mechanism was. We found that 77 percent
of participants identified sanctions as a strong factor (4–5)
in influencing their decision making.
7.2 Efficacy
Figure 3a shows the scores earned by the players. Partici-
pants were more productive in individual sanction games.
The average score in individual sanction games (373) was
greater than in group sanction games (334) with a small
effect size but was statistically significant to 1%. The re-
sult is not surprising because with group sanctions, com-
pliant players were sanctioned because of noncompliance
by others in their group.
Figure 3b shows the number of rounds a player
skipped in a game. On average, the number of rounds
passed in group sanction games is double of those passed
in the individual sanction games, indicating a large effect
at the 1% significance. This observation on rounds passed
explains how group sanctions produce lower scores than
individual sanctions, as Figure 3a shows.
Figure 3c shows the average score gained per task. We
observe that risk-seeking participants complete more high
valued tasks than risk-averse players. This observation is
equally more prominent under individual sanction games
than group sanction games.
After each game, we asked participants to rate how
detrimental the sanctioning mechanism was to comple-
tion of tasks—on a Likert scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being
very detrimental and 5 being not at all detrimental. We
find that participants perceive both group sanctions and
individual sanctions as equally detrimental to their pro-
ductivity.
7
100 200 300 400 500
Individual
Group
µindividual > µgroup, p = 0.01, g = 0.45
(a) Score of players in a game.
0 4 8 12 16
Individual
Group
µindividual < µgroup, p < 0.01, g = 0.82
(b) Number of rounds skipped.
6 8 10 12 14
Risk averse
Risk seeking
Score per task
µRS (13.54) > µRS (12.12); p < 0.01.
(c) Risk seekers (RS) prefer completing higher valued
tasks than risk-averse participants (RA).
Figure 3: Influence of sanctions and risk attitudes on pro-
ductivity.
7.3 Resilience
We calculated the number of rounds a player took to re-
gain immunity lost to an attack. Figure 4a shows that
whereas both group sanction and individual sanction mo-
tivated participants to complete the immunity task imme-
diately (both have a mean close to zero), individual sanc-
tion sees a small improvement in resilience over group
sanction.
Although we observe no significant difference in re-
silience offered by the two sanction types, we notice (Fig-
ure 4b) that risk seekers wait significantly longer to regain
immunity after losing it to an attack. On further analysis,
we find that this difference is prominent only with indi-
vidual sanctions. Under group sanctioning, there is no
significant difference in rounds players took to regain an
immunity. We conjecture that group sanctioning could be
more effective and could offer better resilience in an orga-
nization where a majority of workers are risk seekers.
8 Conclusions
We investigate the effectiveness of group, individual, and
peer sanctions in promoting cybersecurity while recogniz-
0 0.5 1 1.5
Individual
Group
µindividual < µgroup, p = 0.11
(a) Comparing sanction types on rounds taken to regain
immunity, indicating resilience.
0 0.5 1 1.5
Risk averse
Risk seeking
Time (in rounds) to regain immunity
µRS (0.56) > µRA (0.36); p < 0.01.
(b) Risk seekers (RS) wait significantly longer to com-
plete immunity tasks than risk-averse (RA) participants.
Figure 4: Influence of sanctions and risk attitudes on re-
silience.
ing the overhead potentially caused by cybersecurity ac-
tivities on productivity. Our empirical study suggests that
individual sanctions are more effective in enforcing com-
pliance with cybersecurity regulations than group sanc-
tions.
Workers are less productive in completing project
tasks under group sanction than under individual sanction.
Interestingly, the presence of group sanction leads to in-
creased peer sanctions, indicating the potential for obtain-
ing a self-sustaining system.
Sanctions, when leading to loss of work or acting as
blockers in completing daily task, were more effective for
risk-averse workers than risk seekers. Overall, individual
sanctioning is more effective than group sanctioning in
realizing cybersecurity practices.
8.1 Threats to Validity and Mitigation
First, players may not be motivated to give their best.
Hence their game moves may not be carefully thought out.
We offered a bonus based on game performance. Sec-
ond, to ensure the game is understood well, the players
watched a video explaining the game in detail and played
two demo games. Third, as with any study, there is a risk
that the participants may not be representative of the larger
population.
8.2 Future Directions
First, experiments combining group and peer sanction
with the observability of noncompliance being variable
would be interesting. Monitoring can be decreased gradu-
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ally, relying increasingly on peer sanction to keep workers
security compliant. This type of system would scale bet-
ter, but the effect of this on the productivity of participants
is yet to be seen.
Second, it would be interesting to explore positive
sanctions in future studies where complying with security
regulations is rewarded. The final score could be based on
a weighted average of the numbers of security and project
tasks completed, not just the project tasks, as currently.
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